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Abstract
This  study assesses the impact of a French educational policy reform aimed at improving the match
between students and their chosen field of study at university.  As part of this reform, upon applying
for entry to an undergraduate degree course, students are informed about their likelhood of succeeding
given their observed skills.  To examine the effect of the feedback they receive on students' choices,
we compare students applying to different departments within the same university, some implementing
the policy, providing candidates with feedback, whereas others do not.  We find among those receiving
a negative feedback that the proportion of students who decide to register for the degree course in
question is reduced by about 7 percentage points but marginally significant at 10 percent level.  Effects
are heterogeneous according to students' origin and the type of high school they attended.  
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Introduction
In 2014, 470.000 high-school graduates started their post-secondary education in France. This
corresponds  to  roughly  60%  of  a  cohort  obtaining  access  to  higher  education,  a  higher
proportion than ever before. Demand for certain degree courses, as such Health Care or Law,
has risen spectacularly over the past ten years, with an increase of 30% and 18% respectively
of registered first year students (MSER, 2015). Providing adequate conditions to enable such
a large number of entrants to succeed in their studies represents a major challenge for the
French education system.  This problem is accentuated by the fact that these students come
from  diverse educational backgrounds. Additionally, French universities are not allowed to
impose entry requirements and students are free to choose their field of study. This results in
very heterogeneous skills for students entering the higher education system (OECD, 2010). 
Faced with this situation,  the French government adopted a certain number of policies to
increase  the  proportion  of  students completing  their  undergraduate  studies  successfully.3
Some of the main measures put in place intervene early, before students even enter university.
From the moment students indicate their desired course of study, the aim is to assist them in
their choices, and guide them towards the degree best suited to their educational background
and individual abilities.  It  is  crucial  to  offer advice at  this  early point in students'  higher
education careers, as many seek to enter degree courses they are ill prepared for, paving the
way  to  low  performance,  discouragement,  and  subsequent  drop-out.  A majority  of  those
failing the final examinations of their freshman year (about 50 % of each entering cohort), is
likely do so due to a mismatch between course requirements and their skills (Gury, 2007).  
3 The «Plan Réussite en Licence» (2008-2012) is the most famous example.
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The  so-called  «Active  Orientation»  policy,  henceforth  AO,  aims  to  improve  this  match
between students and their chosen degree courses. Put in place in 2009, it informs students
about their  chances of success in the degree courses they have declared their  intention to
apply to during their last year of high-school. Universities are free to choose in which way
they convey this information to students. Most of them elect to give those students expressing
interest in enrolling individual written feedback on the quality of the match to their chosen
degree course, given their grades and the motivation letter they addressed to the university. As
these recommendations are not binding, it is important for universities and policy makers to
assess whether  prospective students  do indeed take into account  the information they are
given when deciding where to enroll. This is particularly salient in the case of the students
who are weakest academically and thus incur the highest risk of failure in their freshman year.
So far, a study evaluating the effectiveness of this policy by assessing how students adjust
their choices upon receiving such feedback has to our knowledge not been carried out.X In
this  article,  we thus examine the effect  of recommendations  emitted by the university  on
students' enrollment decisions. We focus on students receiving negative feedback encouraging
them to reconsider their choices.4  These students are at risk of not being able to cope with the
requirements of the degree they intend to enroll for, notably because they lack the necessary
skills in mathematics and abstract reasoning. We do indeed find an impact of the university
expressing its reservations regarding students' enrollment, cautioning that their skills may not
be sufficient to ensure successful completion of the degree: receiving such feedback reduces
the proportion of students enrolling for the degree course concerned by 7 percentage points.
This effect varies in size among the degree courses concerned and is not always significant at
4  This represents the least favorable feedback out of three types of recommendations emitted: the other two 
indicating a «neutral» or a «positive» message.
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the ten percent level.  This indicates that the academically weakest applicants, who may also
be the least well informed about course requirements, do indeed reconsider their choices when
advised  against  enrolling,  such  that  the  AO  policy  does  indeed  seem  to  help  attenuate
mismatches between students and degree courses.  
Many  recent  studies  show  the  importance  of  incomplete  information  in  human  capital
investment decisions, both regarding the perceived payoff to different educational choices,
and regarding students' perception of their own abilities. Some also testify of the possibility to
improve choices by providing additional information. As an example, Jensen (2010) studies
eigth graders from the Dominican Republic.  He documents students'  misperception of the
returns to education. In his sample, pupils largely underestimate returns, and those randomly
assigned to receive complementary information about the true payoffs are found to complete
more years of education as a result.  In the United States,  Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner
(2014) elicit freshmen's beliefs about own academic ability and about the payoff to the degree
course they are enrolled in. Following the cohort over time, they observe how these beliefs
evolve and how they affect students' choices. For their sample, they find that drop-out rates
can be explained by the evolution of individuals' beliefs in these two domains.  5 Echoeing
this,  on  a  French  sample,  Beaupère  and  Boudesseul  (2009)  describe  the  very  patchy
knowledge students who fail their first year of university have of the requirements of the
university  system,  suggesting  that  here,  too,  additional  information  might  have  improved
choices. 
In this article, we take advantage of a natural experiment to measure the causal effect of the
5 Avery and Kane (2004) and Hastings et al. (2015) also document the lack of information of high school 
students on higher education.
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recommendations sent to prospective students on their enrollment choices for their first year
at university. The data we use stem from several departments of a large French university, one
of which, from a certain point in time onwards, elects to give all students indicating the desire
to enroll the type of feedback described above, while others do not provide such feedback to
their prospective students.  We compare enrollment rates between the treated students, i.e.
those applying to the department providing feedback after a certain point in time, to untreated
students:  those  applying  to  the  same  department,  but  before  the  implementation  of  the
feedback policy,  as well  as those applying to  different  departments,  in order  to obtain an
estimate of the causal effect of the feedback policy.   
We  thus  contribute  to  the  literature  evaluating  the  effect  of  the  provision  of  additional
information to students or their parents on the former's educational careers. In the context of a
US public school choice plan,  Hastings and Weinstein (2008) examine whether  providing
supplementary  information  helps  parents  from  disadvantaged  backgrounds  to  pick  good
schools  for  their  children,  where  school  quality  is  defined  by the  proportion  of  students
successfully graduating. Both the natural experiment and the field experiment whose data they
exploit confirm that obtaining such information indeed orients parents towards better schools,
and that attaining a school of better quality improves pupils' academic achievement. Avery
(2010) carries out a field experiment to measure the impact of college counselling on high-
achieving students from low-income backgrounds. Though many students did not  attend all
the counselling sessions the intervention offered, he finds that students' choices are affected,
notably  regarding their  propensity  to  apply  to  more  competitive colleges.  Bettinger  et  al.
(2012)  implement  a  field  experiment  to  evaluate  whether  students  from  disadvantaged
backgrounds  benefit  from  receiving  assistance  in  applying  for  financial  aid  for  college
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attendance.  They  find  that  the  treatment  group  exhibits  higher  college  attendance  and
persistence rates. Remarkably, benefits even trickle down a generation : among the children of
the original treated participants they find that two year college completion rates increase by 8
percentage points,  from 28 % to 36 %. Oreopoulos and Dunn (2013) provide information
about the benefits of post-secondary education to high-school students, and as a consequence
observe  the  treated  to  expect  higher  returns  and also a  higher  educational  attainment  for
themselves, as opposed to a control group who did not receive the information. In France, a
randomized  field  experiment  run  by  Goux,  Gurgand  and  Maurin  (2014)  informs  low-
achieving students about high-school options which are adapted to their abilities. The group
of students whose aspirations thus became more realistic, and who as a consequence chose the
programs they were most suited for,  were found to show a significant reduction in grade
repetition and high-school drop-out.  Other studies examine the effect feedback about past
performance has on future educational attainment.  Azmat and Iriberri (2010) carry out a field
experiment  in  secondary  schools.  Compared  to  the  control  group,  the  treatment  group
receiving such information saw grades improve by about 5 %.  Of the numerous and diverse
studies  examining different  angles  of  the  impact  of  imperfect  information  on educational
attainment,  and  the  capacity  of  interventions  to  improve  outcomes,  a  majority  find  a
significant  effect  both on choices  and on subsequent  performance of providing additional
information to students and their families. 
With respect to this  literature,  our paper's  contribution is twofold: Firstly,  the information
transmitted to the students in our study concerns their competence relative to the requirements
of the degree course they consider applying to. Such information is highly relevant in the
French context where drop-out rates after the first year of undergraduate studies are extremely
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high.  Secondly,  the  target  population  of  the  specific  intervention  we  analyze  are  low-
performing high-school students whose risk of failing their  first  year is  particularly large.
Measuring the discouraging effect an unfavorable feedback has on their enrollment rates is
particularly salient for informing policies seeking to reduce drop-out rates and better match
students to their chosen programs of study. The following section describes the functioning of
the feedback policy. 
Active Orientation and University enrollment decisions
Context
The AO policy was voted by the French Parliament on August 10th 2007 as part of the law
n°2007-1199 on the «Independence and Responsability of Universities», commonly called
LRU law. The article L123-3 of this law describes the AO policy as an important task of the
public  service  of  education.  Higher  education  institutions,  notably  universities,  are  called
upon  to  inform  applicants  about  how  well  their  desired  course  of  study  matches  their
educational background. The objective of this procedure is to prevent students embarking on
degree  courses  they  are  not  suited  for,  thus  paving  the  way  for  future  difficulties  and
contributing to the high drop-out rate after the first year of higher education.     
Universities convey their feedback to students through a web-based platform called Post-Bac.
Since 2009, each January, high-school students in their final year register on the Post-Bac site
to compile a list of degree courses and higher education institutions they intend to apply to for
entry  in  the  fall  term.  They  are  allowed  to  list  up  to  24  combinations  of  degrees  and
institutions, ranked by order of their preference. Higher education institutions then receive
lists of all candidates having expressed an intention to enter one of their degree courses; this
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list equally contains detailed information on the students' previous education, such as the type
of high-school they went to, the grades they received during their last two years of high-
school, or the optional courses they chose.     
Each department within a university is free to decide upon the criteria it deems most relevant
to judge whether a student's skills correspond to the requirements of the degree course she
intends to enroll in. The feedback students receive consists in one of three types of messages,
which  we  will  designate  as  «positive»,  «neutral»,  or  «negative»  regarding  the  student's
intended choices.6 From mid-April onwards, candidates have access to these messages when
logging in to the Post-Bac website. They can then elect to maintain or modify their choices,
taking into account the feedback they received. In July, after passing their high-school final
exam, those graduating are either assigned to the non-selective degree course that tops their
list of choices, or else, to the first selective one that accepts them. 
In this study, we focus on a single French university that consists of three main departments,
Law, Economics and Business Administration and Communication.7  These departments differ
in the way they provide students with feedback of the kind described above. One of them, we
will  call  it  experimental  department,  provides  feedback  to  all applicants,  sending  an
evaluation to all students expressing an interest to register in one of its degree courses. The
other two departments, which we will call control departments, send feedback only to those
candidates who ask for it.  Under this latter system, only very few students ask for feedback;
in total, around 4% do so in both control departments taken together over the period from
2008-2013.  This represents  1736  prospective  students  in  those  departments.  Moreover,
6 The exact message is provided in Appendix.
7 There is as well a department of Computer Sciences in this institution, but we excluded it because of its 
much smaller size.
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candidates in the treatment department receive feedback based on their grades in mathematics
during their last year of high-school, whereas the control departments evaluate students based
on the major in high-school.  Although in the treament department no strict cut-off exists for
evaluating students regarding their grade in mathematics, we observe that the probability of
receiving a negative feedback increases sharply as students'  grade in mathematics in high-
school  falls  below  10  points  out  of  20.  Similarly,  we  observe  a  sharp  increase  in  the
probability of receiving a positive feedback for students whose grades in mathematics are
above 12 points. For students with grades between 10 and 12 the probability of receiving a
neutral feedback is thus very high. The faculty staff deciding on the recommendations are
indeed advised to use as a principal criterion students' grades in mathematics, but it is at their
discretion to also base their decision on additional information on each student they obtain
through the Post-Bac site, such as the average grade in the student's class, the motivation
letter, or the reputation of the high-school the student attended.8 For the present study, we use
an identification strategy based on comparing the proportion of  students enrolling among
different departments. The AO policy started in 2009, which leaves us with one year of data
before the reform, covering the applicants of the 2008 cohort. These applicants did not receive
any feedback no matter their chosen degree course.  
Does negative feedback lead students to change their field of study? 
The treatment  we focus on consists  in  reception of a  negative feedback, as opposed to  a
neutral one.  We examine the impact this has on the choice of degree course students register
for in their first year at university. We use the students applying to degree courses proposed by
8 In a companion paper, Pistolesi (2016) uses the discontinuity between the numerical score in mathematics in
high school and  the probability to enroll to assess the causal impact of the feedback.
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departments who do not issue such feedback as control groups. To reinforce the validity of our
study,  additional  control  groups  are  constituted  by  students  applying  to  each  of  these
departments and having obtained a grade in mathematics between 10 and 12 points. We thus
measure the effect of receiving a negative feedback as opposed to a neutral one for treated
candidates (ie those applying to the experimental department and with grades in mathematics
below  10),  compared  to  the  non-treated  candidates  (ie  those  applying  to  the  control
department, or disposing of a grade between 10 and 12), and this during the period when the
feedback policy was in place, compared to the year before that. This triple difference method
is explained in more detail in the following section.
Data and Identification Strategy 
The  aim  of  this  study  is  to  assess  the  causal  effect  receiving  negative  feedback  has  on
students' decision to register in a given degree course at entry into university.  This feedback
is  given  to  a  specific  group  among  them,  those  having  obtained  less  than  10  points  in
mathematics in high-school, we call these the treatment group. To measure this effect we need
to control for any systematic shock affecting the entry to the experimental degree courses
correlated  with  the  implementation  of  the  AO  policy.  To  neutralize  any  shock  affecting
enrollment to any degree course at a given point in time, we include time dummies for each
period. We also include dummies for each type of degree course  to account for permanent
differences between the mean characteristics of the applicants.  Finally, we include degree-by-
year dummies to control for any shock specific to each course that is correlated with the start
of the AO policy.  To sum up, we compare candidates  receiving negative feedback in the
experimental  degree  courses  to  individuals  in  the  same  degree  courses  but  who  receive
different feedback, and we measure the relative change in the decision to register with respect
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to candidates in degree courses that did not implement this feedback policy. 
This  identification  strategy  mirrors  closely,  and  extends,  the  difference-in-differences
approach.9 The latter method consists in comparing the evolution over time of a treatment
group, affected by the reform,  to that of a control group not touched by it.  However, our
method has the advantage of requiring weaker assumptions than the latter, which suits our
objective. In particular, it does not necessitate, contrary to the double-difference strategy, that
the time trend of the explained variable be parallel for the treatment group and for the control
group, since we use a third degree of comparison within both groups, between those having
negative feedback and those who do not, allowing different temporal changes between the
treatment and the control groups. Our difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) estimator
only requires  that  there  be  no  shock  affecting  simultaneously  the  relative  choices  of  the
treatment group in the same degree course and the same year as the start of the AO policy.
These weaker assumptions are crucial for our pupose, as clearly in our case it would not be
credible  to  regard  students  scoring  below  10  points  in  mathematics  and  listing  a  non-
experimental department as a control group not affected by the reform. Indeed, as students are
allowed to list multiple options even within the same university among the degree courses
they  consider  desirable  options  for  themselves,  it  is  natural  that  the  non-experimental
departements  will  also  be  affected  by  this  reform :  Students  having  received  a  negative
feedback  when  requesting  entry  into  a  degree  course  dispensed  by  the  experimental
departement and who are deterred by this information, are likely to turn not only to other
universities, but to different degree courses within the same university. This is all the more
likely  as  the  information  they  receive  through  the  feedback  pertains  to  their  lack  of
9 Gruber (1994) is the first study introducing the DDD estimator in a very different context.
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mathematical skills, which would endanger their success in any degree course requiring such
skills, be it at this university or another. Thus, it is natural that these students should turn
towards  degrees  requiring  less  mathematical  knowledge and abstract  thinking,  within  the
same university. Similarly, students scoring above 10 out of 20 points cannot be regarded as
unaffected  by  the  reform either,  as  they,  too,  receive  new information  after  the  policy  is
implemented which may affect  their  decision :  Not  receiving negative feedback,  and thus
indirectly receiving approval regarding their planned course of study, may indeed confirm
them in their choice and increase their enrollment rate, just as receiving negative feedback
may lower the propensity to enroll for those who receive it. Thus, we will use the terminology
of treatment versus control, and experimental versus non-experimental groups to facilitate the
description  and  distinction  of  the  various  groups  of  students  concerned,  who  are  either
directly or only indirectly affected by the policy. 
We therefore stress here that what we aim to measure is the relative change in enrollment rates
between low- and higher-achieving students (the former likely to receive negative feedback,
the latter not) within the department issueing such feedback (the experimental one), compared
to the relative change in enrollment between these two groups of students in departments not
issueing feedback (the non-experimental ones). This overall change in relative propensity to
enroll constitutes our parameter of interest, and it is composed of changes in enrollment rates
induced in various subgroups, as outlined above : (1) those directly affected by the feedback,
as  regarding  their  enrollment  in  the  degree  they  received  feedback  for,  (2)  those  same
students, but regarding their choice to enroll in another department, (3) students receiving
neutral as opposed to negative feedback, who may find themselves encouraged to pursue their
desired option.  
A triple difference estimation captures this relative change, composed of changes in various
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subgroups of students, and allows to derive a causal interpretation of the policy we examine
under the very weak assumption  mentioned above: that there be no other shock affecting
these relative  enrollment rates and coinciding with the moment of implementaion of the AO
policy.                    
In  order  to  implement  this  method,  we  use  administrative  data  of  a  French  university,
covering  the years  2008-2013.   To do so,  we merge two databases:  the  first  is  based on
information retrieved through the Post-Bac website. It collects details for students whose list
of desired degree courses included one of those proposed by the university. These data include
socio-demographics, such as age, gender, place of living or nationality, but also a detailed
account of the grades obtained in high-school,  the name and location of the school, as well as
a national student identification number. The Post-Bac data also contain information on the
degree  courses  each  student  considers  registering  in,  and  on  the  kind  of  feedback  they
received as part of the AO policy whose impact we seek to evaluate. The second source of
data we use stems from the administrative services of the university itself. It records the name
and national identification number of all students enrolled at the university, as well as the
degree course they are actually enrolled in. Unfortunately, we do not have access to the grades
the students  obtained once enrolled at  university.  Each year,  around 10.000 senior   high-
school students list at least one of the degree courses the university proposes as a desired
option. Around 3.000 of them then decide to enroll at the university each fall.  
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Figure 1: Enrollment Rates by Year and Treatment Status
Notes: The graph on the left hand side shows the yearly enrollment rates separately for the experimental and non-experimental departments.
The graph on the right hand side displays yearly enrollment rates separately for treated and control groups (Mathematics grade lower than
10/20 or between 10 and 12/20, respectively).
Figure 1 presents the change over time in the enrollment rate between 2008 and 2013 for
several groups of students. The left panel compares the proportion of applicants that register
in the experimental department,  providing feedback to any first year applicant, with the non-
experimental  departments  that  do  not  provide  feedback.  The  right  panel  displays  the
probability  to  register  in  the  experimental  department  for  those  with  mathematics  grades
below 10, and for those with grades between 10 and 12. In both panels we do not observe any
different change over time. If the time trend was different in any of the panels, it would not
invalidate the hypothesis of our approach. As we use a triple difference approach, the parallel
trend assumption is not necessary, as explained above.
A drawback of these data that needs to be kept in mind is that they do not provide information
on the enrollment decisions of students who do not end up enrolling in one of the degree
courses proposed by the university. We thus cannot tell whether students who decide not to
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enroll at this university go on enrolling at a selective course of study outside the university
system (such as a «classe prépa», or IUT), whether they enroll for a non-selective degree
course at another university, or else decide not to pursue post-secondary studies at all. This is
an important drawback, but it seems likely that its implications are limited if we recall the
type of students on whom we study the impact of receiving negative feedback: this almost
exclusively concerns those who obtain less than 10 out of 20 points in mathematics at high-
school. They are thus unlikely to be accepted for entry to selective degree courses. The option
of renouncing from further studies altogether does not seem to be of major relevance either:
national  aggregate  statistics  show  that  almost  all  students  having  obtained  high-school
diploma pursue post-secondary studies (MSER, 2015).  Consequently, based on these facts,
we  can  safely  assume  that  most  students  reconsidering  their  choice  due  to  unfavorable
feedback will end up enrolling for a non-selective degree within the university system which
poses weaker requirements on their skills in mathematics. 
Our database initially contains information on 61.086 senior high-school students over the
period from 2008 to 2013. We firstly eliminate from these data individuals who do not pass
their final year of high-school in mainland France. Secondly, we only keep students having a
grade of no more than 12 out of 20 points in mathematics in the first semester of their final
year  of  high-school.  Of  those  remaining,  we  keep  those  for  whom none  of  the  relevant
variables  is  missing.  This  reduces  our  sample  by  8.414  observations  based  on  the  first
criterion, by 20.062 observations based on the second one, and by 442 observations due to
missing variables. Our remaining sample thus yields information on the desired options listed,
the type of feedback received (if any), and the enrollment choices of 31.168 senior high-
school students between 2008 and 2013. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics based on our
final sample.
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The  left  hand  side  panel  displays  figures  for  the  students  whose  high-school  grades  in
mathematics fall below 10 points, the right hand side panel covers those whose grades fall
between 10 and 12 points. Within each panel, the different columns distinguishe between the
experimental  department,  that  is,  the one giving feedback to all  students,  and the control
departments, which do not give such systematic feedback. Furthermore, within each of these
groups, we distinguish between the period before and those after implementation of the AO
policy.  
Table 1 shows that the proportion of students receiving unfavorable feedback is much higher
among those  whose  grades  fall  below 10/20 in  mathematics  than  for  their  peers  scoring
between  10  and  12  points:  87%  relative  to  33%,  respectively.  Students  listing  the
experimental department among their options are somewhat more likely to be male than those
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Grade in Mathematics<10/20
Non-Experimental Dept Experimental Dept Non-Experimental Dept Experimental Dept
Before AO After AO Before AO After AO Before AO After AO Before AO After AO
Enrollment (%) 0.33 0.35 0.4 0.36 0.4 0.4 0.38 0.38
0.47 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Negative Feedback (%) 0 0 0 0.87 0 0 0 0.33
0 0 0 0.34 0 0 0 0.47
Age 19.05 19.03 18.94 19.02 18.92 18.78 18.84 18.71
1.01 1.09 1.01 1.08 1.03 1.03 1.14 0.99
Male (%) 0.45 0.44 0.64 0.67 0.41 0.38 0.65 0.58
0.5 0.5 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.49
French Nationality (%) 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.93
0.27 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.24 0.28 0.25
Needs-based scholarship (%) 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.17
0.45 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.4 0.37
General High School (%) 0.94 0.9 0.97 0.9 0.92 0.89 0.93 0.91
0.24 0.29 0.16 0.3 0.27 0.31 0.25 0.29
Public High School (%) 0.81 0.78 0.81 0.76 0.77 0.74 0.78 0.74
0.39 0.42 0.36 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.41 0.44
Distance to University (%) 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.16
0.19 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.2 0.23 0.21 0.23
Observations 558 9363 222 3129 1086 11591 484 4735
Table 1 : Descriptive Statistics
 Grade in Mathematics>10 and <12/20
Notes: The table indicates the average characteristics of the sample, along with standard deviations. Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 describe candidates in non-
experimental departments, columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 candidates in the experimental department.  AO stands for  Active Orientation Policy. 
listing the non-experimental ones (65% as opposed to 45%).  Otherwise, candidates in the two
types of departments are comparable in all major characteristics: in terms of age, likelihood to
enroll, nationality, socio-economic status of their parents (as measured by receiving financial
aid during high-school), whether they attend a general  or a vocational high-school, whether it
is a public or private school, and in terms of the distance of this school to the university. We
observe some evolution over time in the composition of the different groups: Among those
listing options from the experimental department, the proportion of students having attended a
general  high-school  diminishes  from  97%  to  90%,  and  the  proportion  of  male  students
decreases  from  65%  to  58%  among  the  group  scoring  between  10  and  12  points  in
mathematics. In the regressions we use in the analysis we control for these variables in order
to obtain an effect that does not depend on these changes. 
 The effect of negative feedback on enrollment 
Table 2 illustrates the method of estimation in triple differences of the  impact of negative
feedback on students' enrollment decisions. Panel A compares the change in the enrollment
rate for candidates in the experimental department who have a grade of less than 10 points in
mathematics to the enrollment rate for those who equally have a grade of less than 10 points
but are candidates in the non-experimental department. Each cell indicates the proportion of
students who enrolled, as well as the standard error of this proportion. After AO has started
we  observe  a  drop  of  3,4  percentage  points  in  the  enrollment  rate  in  the  experimental
department for this group of students. For non-experimental departments, those not giving
systematic feedback to all students, we observe on the contrary an increase of 2.3 percentage
points between the pre-implementation period in 2008, and the post-implementation period of
2009-2013, on the other hand.   Overall, for students with grades in mathematics below 10
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points,  we thus  observe  a  relative  change  of  -5.7  percentage  points  in  enrollment  in  the
experimental relative to the non-experimental departments from 2009 onwards. To put this
effect into perspective, 35% of students enroll in non-experimental degree courses, as shown
in Table 1; the effect is thus sizeable. However, if there were shocks affecting only enrollment
in  the  experimental  department, or  vice  versa,  at  the  same  time  period  as  the  date  of
implementation  of  the  AO  policy,  this  difference-in-differences  estimate  would  not  be  a
correct measure of the causal effect of the policy. In panel B of Table 2 we therefore carry out
the same exercise, again on candidates for both types of departments, but this time on those
whose grades in mathematics fall between 10 and 12 points. They are suitable to serve as
control groups as they are highly unlikely to receive a negative feedback. For this group, we
find that under AO, the enrollment rate in degrees proposed by the experimental department
increases by 0.6 percentage points relative to enrollment in degrees in the non-experimental
departements. This increase is not significant at the standard thresholds though. We obtain our
triple-difference estimate if we now take the difference between the values obtained in each of
the two panels. The result is displayed at the bottom of the Table. We find that with respect to
the time period before the AO policy, the enrollment rate afterwards is 6.2 percentage points
lower for students whose high-school grade in mathematics is below 10 points, and who are
candidates  for  a  degree  in  the  experimental  department  applying  the  feedback  policy,
compared to students in the same department whose grade in mathematics lies between 10
and 12 points, and to students in the other departements. However this effect is not significant
at the 10% level.
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The above triple differences estimator amounts to a mere comparison of mean enrollment
rates between different groups. To obtain more precise estimates of this effect, we use a linear
regression analysis. Controlling for observed heterogeneity, the regression estimates reduce
the standard error of the coefficients. The estimating equation we use is the following one:
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Before start of AO After start of AO
Experimental Department 0.396 0.363 -0.034
0.034
Non-Experimental Department 0.33 0.353 0.023
0.021
Difference between departments 0.067 0.01
Difference in Differences -0.057
0.04
Experimental Department 0.38 0.384 0.004
0.023
Non-Experimental Department 0.398 0.396 -0.002
0.016
Difference between departments -0.018 -0.012
Difference in Differences 0.006
0.028
Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference -0.062
0.049
Table 2: Triple difference estimates of the negative feedback on enrollment decisions
Difference 
btw. periods
A Treatment group : Candidates with grades of less than 10 points out of 20 in mathematics
B. Control group : Candidates with grades between 10 and 12 points in mathematics
Notes : The table shows the enrollment probabilities for first year of studies for different groups of students, along with the 
corresponding standard deviations. The first column describes these probabilities in 2008, the second column between 2009 and 
2013.
y ijt=α+β1 X ij+β2 τ t+β3δ j+β4 Fi+β5(δ j×τ t)+β6(τ t×F i)+β7(δ j×F i)+β8(δ j×τ t×F i)+ϵijt .(1)
where  i indicates individuals, j  indicates degree courses (with 1 denoting degrees dispensed
by the experimental department, and 0 all others) and t denotes time periods (taking the value
1 for periods after implementation of the policy, and 0 otherwise). yijt represents the decision
to enroll at university (taking the value 1 if the student enrolls, 0 otherwise), Xij is a vector of
observed individual characteristics and of those of the high-school attended, δj is a department
fixed effect, τt a fixed effect for each time period, and F a dummy variable for students whose
high-school grade in mathematics is below 10 points. The coefficient of interest is β8 . Just as
the overall  effect obtained in Table 2 and described above, it  measures the change in the
enrollment rate of the treated individuals from the date of implementation of the AO policy in
the department applying the policy, compared to students having higher mathematics grades
or  who are  enrolled  in  other  departments.  The  control  variables  Xij include  age,  gender,
nationality, (1 indicating French individuals, 0 all others), socio-economic status as measured
by receiving financial aid in high-school, and finally indicators for taking additonnal optional
courses during high-school. The characteristics describing the high-school attended include:
an indicator for public versus private status, if it is a general or vocational high-school,  the
distance between the high-school and the university, as well as the squared distance. Finally,
the pass-rate of the end of high-school exam (called baccalauréat) in log is used to measure
differences in high-school quality.
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Results from estimations of equation (1) are displayed in Table 3; each column corresponds to
a  different  specification.  In  the  first  column,  no  explanatory  variables  are  added  to  the
regression,  so  that  we  reproduce  the  result  shown  in  Table  2:  a  treatment  effect  of  6.2
percentage points, significant at only 19.6%. In column 2 we see that introducing the time
invariant control variables Xij  improves precision as we are able to explain a larger share of
the  variance:  the  estimated  treatment  effect  is  slightly  larger  in  absolute  value  at  -7.3
percentage points and significant at an 11% level.  The third column shows the coefficients
resulting from a specification replacing the indicator  variable  for  the post-implementation
periods by five indicators, one for each of the five post-implementation years included in our
data, 2009 up to 2013. This captures yearly fluctuations in enrollment rates across all degree
courses,  and  thus  reduces  the  share  of  unexplained  variance,  such  that  the  estimated
coefficient of -7.6 percentage points is now significant at the 10% level.  Finally, the fourth
column  displays  results  from  an  inclusion  of  period-by-department  dummies,  that  is,
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Table 3: Regression Analysis: Effect of Negative Feedback on Enrollment  
1 2 3 4
Negative Feedback -0.062 -0.073 -0.076 -0.075
(0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046)
Control Variables N Y Y Y
Year dummies N N Y Y
Departmental trends N N N Y
Observations 31168 31168 31168 31168
R Squared 0,002 0.072 0.075 0.085
Dependent Variable : Share of Candidates Enrolled 
Notes :  Column 1: DDD regression without controls;  Column 2: DDD regression with controls; 
Column 3: DDD regression with controls and dummies for each treatment year; Column 4: DDD 
regression with controls and year-departments dummies.
interaction  terms  between  the  indicators  for  the  experimental  vs  non-experimental
departments, and a linear time effect (see Angrist et Pischke, 2008). We find a coefficient of
-7.5  percentage  points.  It  is  almost  identical  in  size  to  the  previous  specification.  This
indicates  that  results  are  robust  to  time  varying  shocks  affecting  experimental  and  non-
experimental departments differently. These results thus lead us to confirm the conclusion that
those candidates  receiving negative feedback are about  7  percentage  points  less  likely  to
enroll than their peers receiving neutral feedback, a coefficient just significant at a 10% level
in our regression specification.   
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1 2 3 4 5
Mathematics grade <10/20 -0,076
(0,047)
Mathematics grade >7 and <10/20 -0,062
(0,047)
Candidates for Z1 -0,099
(0,06)
Candidates for Z2 -0,074
(0,075)
Candidates for Z3 -0,036
(0,098)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 31168 30833 24828 27256 24280
R-squared 0,075 0,075 0,078 0,076 0,074
Table 4 :Effect of negative feedback on enrollment for different treatment groups
Dependent variable : Share of Candidates Enrolled
Notes : The table shows the effect of negative feedback on the choice to enroll for different sub-groups of treated students. (1) 
Main specification. (2) Restricts group of treated students to those with grades in mathematics between 7 and 10/20, (3) restricts 
the sample to candidates for Z1  (4) restricts the sample to candidates for Z2 (5) restricts to candidates for Z3.  Z1, Z2 and Z3 
refer to different degree courses within the experimental department, as outlined in the main text.
Table 4 shows the regressions corresponding to the specification used in column 3 of Table 3
(inclusion of time dummies for each period), but distinguishes between different treatment
groups,  all  composed  of  candidates  for  entry  into  degree  courses  proposed  by  the
experimental department, but differing in either their mathematics grades at high-school, or
else in the degree course they enroll  in among those offered by the department.  The first
column reproduces the results from Table 3 to allow for easy comparison. The second column
of Table 4 restricts the sample of treated students to those whose grade in mathematics at
high-school falls between 7 and 10 points out of 20; arguably a more homogeneous group that
is  also  more  similar  to  their  peers  in  the  control  group.10 The  estimated  treatment  effect
decreases  slighlty  in  absolute  value,  but  is  still  close  to  that  estimated  before,  at  -6.2
percentage points. 
Column 3 to column 5 of Table 4 divide the sample of individuals composing the treatment
group according to the degree course dispensed by the experimental department that they
listed. In the experimental department there are three degree courses that we will call Z1, Z2
and Z3.  Z1 integrates  elements  of  the humanities  and therefore necessitates  good French
langage skills,  both written and oral,  Z3 is  more technical  with a  heavy weight  given to
mathematics,  and  Z2  is  in  between  the  two  previous  degree  courses  in  terms  of  skill
requirements. These three different degree courses use the same feedback system and apply
the same criteria according to which feedback is given. The third column of Table 4 restricts
the treatment group to candidates for degree course Z1, the fourth column to candidates for
Z3,   and the  fifth  to  those who are candidates  for  Z2.  The estimated treatment  effect  of
receiving negative feedback is  close for  candidates  for  Z1 and Z2,  and a  little  higher  in
absolute value than the one obtained from estimation on the whole sample: -9.9  and -7.4
10 We tested the effect of imposing different restrictions on the lower bound for the mathematics grade, with 
similar results.
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percentage points, respectively. For candidates to Z3, we obtain an effect that is much smaller
in absolute terms, -3.6 percentage points, and not significant. A possible interpretation of this
difference observed for candidates for Z3 might be that these students already have a good
knowledge of their own skills in mathematics, or believe they do, such that feedback affects
their choices less. 
Table 5 displays results from further robustness checks, which are obtained, firstly, by varying
the  time  periods  taken  into  account  for  the  treatment  period,  so  as  to  evaluate  possible
differences  between  short-  and  longer-term  effects  of  the  policy.  Secondly,  we  also
differenciate treatment groups by the region of residency of the students' parents, and by the
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1 2 3 4
Period 2009-2010 -0.072
(0.048)
Period 2011-2013 -0.068
(0.048)
Same Region as University -0.109
 (0.058)
General High School -0.064
(0.053)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y
Observations 14046 19472 21262 24741
R-squared 0.1 0.06 0.035 0.085
Table 5 : Effect of Negative Feedback on Enrollment : Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable : Share of Candidates Enrolled
Notes : The table shows the effect of negative feedback on enrollment for different sub-samples of the 
treated students. Column 1 restricts the treatment period to 2009-2010. Column 2 restricts to 2011-2013. 
Column 3 focuses on students living in the same region as the university. Column 4 includes only students 
attending a general high school.
type of high-school the students attend. By comparing results for these different sub-groups of
the  treated  students,  we  assess  whether  the  effect  is  homogeneous  across  the  treated
population of students. 
The first column compares enrollment rates between the period before implementation of  the
AO policy, 2008, and the first two years it was in place, 2009 and 2010.  The second column
restricts the treatment period to the three remaining years in our data when the policy was in
place, 2011 through 2013. Comparing the coefficients obtained from these two estimations
allows to assess whether the medium term effect of the policy, as measured 3 to 5 years after
implementation, differs from that observed during the first two years.  We observe only the
slightest difference between the coefficients: while the effect size during the first two years is
-7.2 percentage points, it is -6.8 percentage points during the later three years. The precision
of the estimates is lower, as we divided the sample and thus reduced its size: the estimated
coefficients are only significant at the 13% and 16% levels, respectively.
The estimates displayed in the third column of Table 5 result from restricting our sample to
students living in the same region as the university. They represent the majority of candidates.
We  find  that  the  estimated  coefficient  is  indeed  larger  in  absolute  value  for  students
originating from the same region as the university: receiving a negative feedback as opposed
to a neutral one reduces the probability of enrollment by 10.9 percentage points. This is likely
due to the fact that students from other regions tend to list this university as one of their less
desired options ; they try first to gain entry to a university closer to their home. Thus, they
often decide not to register at this university in any case, independently of the feedback they
receive. The effect of feedback for this group is thus weaker, and excluding them thereby
increases the estimated coefficient's absolute value.   
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Finally,  column 4 lists results  of a regression where the sample is constituted of  students
attending  a  general  high-school,  as  opposed  to  a  vocational  one.  These  students  are  on
average more likely to go on to study for higher  education degrees which take longer to
complete, such as the ones we examine here. We do not find any marked difference in effect
size  for  these  students  however;  the  estimated  drop  in  the  likelihood  to  enroll  is  6.4
percentage points.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this study, we examine whether the  ''Active Orientation'' policy has an impact on the kind
of degree course students decide to enroll in for their first year at university.  Students whose
skills in mathematics the university deems to be too low to successfully complete the degree
course they intend to enroll in will more often modify their choice if informed of their low
chances of success in their preferred subject. Among students having listed a degree course as
a desired option, the enrollment probability diminishes by about 7 percentage points after
implementation of the AO policy, under which feedback is provided to all students expressing
the desire to enroll. This drop is a sizeable effect when compared to an average enrollment
probability of 35 percent before  implementation of the policy. We find this result to be robust
across different specifications, notably regarding different definitions of who constitutes the
treated group of students. The deterrence effect of receiving negative feedback is greater for
students living in the same region as the university, and for those whose chosen specialization
in high-school is less relevant to the subject of the degree course they intend to enroll in. 
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However, it is important to qualify these findings, due to several factors. Firstly, the estimated
coefficient is only marginally significant at the ten percent level. This is notably due to the
fact that the data available only cover a single year of observations before implementation of
the feedback policy, namely those students entering higher education institutions in the fall of
2008. To our knowledge, no data have been collected  before 2008 since Post-Bac site was not
existing. As a consequence, the sample size is reduced. The comparison of the periods before
and after implementation of the policy is thus less precise than it would be were additional
cohorts of students observed before 2008. 
Finally, different approaches to assess the impact of this feedback policy may lead to sizeable
differences in the estimated effect sizes. A companion study, Pistolesi (2016), uses the same
data but relies on a different identification strategy. It takes advantage of the fact that there
exists a threshold grade in mathematics below which university staff sending the feedback are
expected to indicate their reservations regarding the students desired choice.  This allows to
apply  a  regression  discontinuity  design  (Hahn,  et  al.  2001),  comparing  the  decisions  of
students whose grades are situated just below the threshold to those with grades just above it.
These two groups of students are arguably very similar, the only difference between them
being that one group is highly likely to receive negative feedback. In this setting, using sub-
samples of students alike in everything but the feedback their receive, the marginal effect of
the policy is found to be more pronounced than in the present study. The probability to enroll
diminishes by about 14 percentage points for those receiving negative feedback compared to
those whose feedback is neutral. This constitutes a sizeable difference between the results of
the two studies.  A regression discontinuity design is  by definition focused on individuals
situated just  below and just  above the cutoff value of the running variable,  a much more
restricted sample than the one studied here. Comparing the results of the two studies thus
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allows  us  to  conclude  that  those  individuals  situated  close  to  the  threshold  are  the  most
sensitive to receiving negative feedback and the most likely to modify their decision as a
consequence. 
Extensions  that  should  be  explored  in  future  work  include  a  closer  examination  of  the
destination of students changing their mind following the negative feedback received. The
data we have obtained so far do unfortunately not allow us to pursue this question further.
Another important dimension to take into account for an evaluation of the effectiveness of the
feedback policy is of course the possible changes that occured in drop-out rates after the first
year  at  university,  as  well  as  in  mean  grades  in  first  year  examinations,  or  indeed  in
graduation rates with a three year undergraduate degree. As the policy was implemented with
the aim of lowering the failure rates during the first years of university studies, it is crucial to
find out whether on average students achieve better results at the end of their first year, and if
those students who against the advice given to them decide to go ahead with their original
plan and enroll, do indeed worse during their subsequent studies. We aim to pursue our study
of the AO policy in the directions outlined above in work to be carried out in the near future.
28
References:
Angrist,  J.D  and  Pischke,  J.S.  (2008)  Mostly  Harmless  Econometrics:  An  Empiricist's
Companion, Princeton University Press.
Avery,  C.  (2010) The  Effect  of  College  Counseling  on  High-Achieving,  Low-Income
Students, NBER Working paper 16359.
Avery,  C.  and Kane,  T.  (2004)  Student  Perceptions  of  college  opportunities:  the  Boston
COACH program», dans Caroline Hoxby (ed.) College Choices: The Economics of Where to
Go, When to Go, and How to Pay for It, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Azmat,  G.  and  Iriberri,  N.  (2010) The  Importance  of  Relative  Performance  Feed-back
Information: Evidence from a Natural Experiment using High-School Students,  Journal of
Public Economics 94: 435–452.
Beaupère, N. and Boudesseul, G. (2009) Sortir sans diplôme de l'université - comprendre les
parcours d'étudiants «décrocheurs», la Documentation Française, Paris.
Bettinger, E., Long, T. and Oreopoulos, P. (2012) The Role of Application Assistance and
Information in College Decisions, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(3): 1205–1242.
Goux, D., Gurgand, M. and Maurin, E. (2015) Adjusting your Dreams? High-School Plans
and Dropout Behaviour, The Economic Journal, forthcoming.
Gruber, J. (1994) The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, The American Economic
Review, 84(3):622-641.
Gury,  N.  (2007)  Les  sortants  sans  diplôme de  l'Enseignement  Supérieur:  Temporalité  de
l'Abandon et Profils des Décrocheurs, L'orientation scolaire et professionnelle 36(2):137-156.
29
Hahn, J., Todd, P. and Van der Klauuw (2001)  Identification en Estimation of Treatment
Effects with a Regression Discontinuity Design, Econometrica 69(1):201-09.
Hastings,  J.  S.  and  Weinstein,  J.  M.  (2008) Information,  school  choice,  and  academic
achievement:  Evidence  from  two  experiments,  The  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics pp.
1373–1414.
Hastings,  J.S.,  Neilson,  C.A.,  Ramirez,  A.  and  Zimmerman,  S.   (2010)  (Un)informed
College and Major Choice Evidence from Linked Survey and Administrative Data,  NBER
Working Paper 21330.
Lemaire,  S.  (2004)  Que deviennent  les  bacheliers  après  le  baccalauréat?,  INSEE,  France
Portrait Social.
MSER (2015) L’État de L'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche en France, Ministère
de l'éducation nationale, Paris.
OCDE (2010) Regards sur l'Education 2010: Les Indicateurs de l'OCDE, OCDE, Paris. 
Oreopoulos,  P.  and Dunn,  R.  (2013) Information  and College  Access:  Evidence  from a
Randomized Field Experiment, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1(01): 3–26.
Pistolesi, N. (2016) Advising Students on Their Field of Study: Quasi-Experimental Estimates
From a French University Reform, TSE Working Paper.
Stinebrickner,  T.R  and  Stinebrickner  R. (2014)  Academic  Performance  and  College
Dropout: Using Longitudinal Expectations Data to Estimate a Learning Model,  Journal of
Labor Economics, 32(3):601-644.
30
Appendix: Content of the feedback sent to candidates for entry into the first 
year of an undergraduate degree
The feedback given to students who express their desire to register for a degree course is sent
via the Post-Bac website. There are three options: positive, neutral and negative feedback. The
text these messages contain is standardised and exactly the same for any student receiving the
same kind of feedback. The three messages are: 
Positive feedback: ''You expressed the wish to enroll in the first year of an undergraduate
degree in X at Z University. After examination of your application form we approve of your
choice. We would nonetheless like to remind you that to study for this degree requires a sound
knowledge of mathematics, the capacity to handle a large workload and a taste for abstract
reasoning''.   
Neutral  feedback: ''You expressed the wish to enroll in the first  year of an undergraduate
degree in X at Z University. After examination of your application form, we would like to
express some reservations regarding your choice. From the grades you obtained, and from the
options you chose in your last two years of high-school, it seems to us that your mastery of
the skills required for this degree course is insufficient as yet. However, if  you are highly
motivated and ready to work extremely hard, enrollment in this degree may still be a viable
option. We would like to remind you however that studying for this degree requires a sound
knowledge of mathematics, the capacity to handle a large workload and a taste for abstract
reasoning''. 
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Negative feedback: ''You expressed the wish to enroll in the first year of an undergraduate
degree in X at Z University. After examination of your application form, we have to advise
you against this choice. Successfully studying for this degree requires a sound knowledge of
mathematics and a taste for abstract reasoning, and your profile does not seem to correspond
to these requirements. We invite you to contact your school's career counselor''.
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